secria.eu

Is multi-factor authentication mandatory in the transport sector? Where it is and isn't expected

Multi-factor authentication appears in almost every NIS2 questionnaire for transport companies, but not every system lends itself to it equally well. This article shows where MFA is typically expected and where other measures take its place.

Short answer

The NIS2 Directive mentions multi-factor authentication, often called MFA or two-step verification, as an example of a measure that belongs to good cyber hygiene. There is no hard list anywhere stating which systems must have it. What is there, in Article 21, is that an organisation takes appropriate and proportionate measures based on risk. In practice for transport companies, this means that MFA is almost always expected on remote access and administrative accounts, and the discussion only becomes interesting for planning systems, tracking and the connection with clients.

Whether your organisation itself falls under the duty of care, or whether you receive this question because a client is assessing you as a supplier, does not determine whether MFA is useful — what determines that is primarily who is asking the question. see in a few questions how your organisation stands in the supply chain.

Where MFA in the transport sector is typically expected

The places where supervisors and clients look first are the places where someone from outside the office can access business systems. That is email, that is a VPN connection, and those are the accounts of administrators who can access multiple systems at once. A password alone is seen as insufficient there, because a leaked or guessed password would then be the only barrier between an outsider and the rest of the network.

This also applies to cloud applications opened from a private phone or home laptop, such as an accounting package or an HR system. Precisely because these apps are accessible everywhere, a second check is requested more often there than for a system that only runs at the office behind a secure network.

Planning systems: why this is often the first place

A transport management system (TMS) is usually at the top of the list, and that is no coincidence. Planners often log into it from outside the office, the system contains route information, customer data and sometimes links with billing, and an unauthorised person who gets in can disrupt schedules without this being immediately apparent. Because this system is both sensitive and easy to secure — most TMS providers support MFA by default — this is often the first point where a client or supervisor asks about it.

Tracking systems and the connection with clients

With tracking and telematics it is more nuanced. A dashboard where a dispatcher monitors vehicles works fine for MFA. But much tracking data runs through machine-to-machine connections: a device in the vehicle sends data to a server, and that server shares some of it via an API with the client's system. With these kinds of connections, there is no person logging in, so MFA in the conventional sense — a code alongside a password — does not apply here. Instead, other safeguards are looked at: secured keys, limited rights per connection and logging of which system is allowed to communicate with which other system.

The same logic applies to the connection with a client themselves, for example a customer portal where trip statuses are reported or an EDI connection for orders. A client asking for MFA in a questionnaire usually means by that the access of your own staff to your own systems, not the technical connection between two servers. It is convenient for both parties if this distinction is made explicit in the conversation, so that a question is not unintentionally answered too broadly or asked too broadly.

Where MFA is practically difficult — and what is asked for instead

In a cabin or at a loading dock, a driver often works with a shared device or an older onboard computer that does not support modern login methods. The same applies to some older planning systems that still run on a local network and were not designed with a second verification step in mind. In those cases, it is generally not expected that a company replace a system to enable MFA, but rather that thought has been given to an alternative measure: a restricted network, a short password policy, or a clear agreement about who may use the device and when it is locked. Supervisory authorities look at whether the choice is substantiated, not whether each system is technically equipped identically.

What this means for your conversation with a client

A question about MFA in a security questionnaire is rarely a yes-or-no question once you examine it per system. It helps to map out for yourself which systems are opened by people and which are accessed by machines talking to each other, and to keep these two categories separate in your answer. Such an overview, with the status of each system and who owns that measure, is exactly what a living register is for. read per topic from the security obligations what is expected and consult frequently asked questions about the security obligations and the questionnaires.

For the specific requirements in your own contract or questionnaire, the text of the contracting authority or the supervisory authority remains binding; this article describes how the assessment is generally made, not what applies specifically to your organization. If you are uncertain about the arrangements in your own situation, a lawyer or the competent supervisory authority is the appropriate point of contact.

Would you like to see first where your organization stands in this chain, before you get started with MFA and the rest of the security obligations? take the free NIS2 check and read the explanation of the result immediately.

This article is general information and not legal advice.